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Marialena Avgerinou
Wittgenstein’s language and Beckett: 
the limits of language and the absurd
Abstract This paper provides a parallel linguistic and conceptual reading of 
Wittgenstein’s and Beckett’s works. More specifically, the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations are looked at in relation to the 
absurd plays Not I and Waiting for Godot, respectively. The limits of language as 
described in the Tractatus are part of the verbally and conceptually asphyxiating 
world brought on stage by Beckett in the monologue Not I, while the transition 
to ‘language games’ of the Philosophical Investigations can be identified in parts 
of Waiting for Godot. The suggested conclusion is that Wittgenstein’s expression 
of the ineffable, the problematic use of language and (its) meaning can be and 
have been expressed in a form of art, while the meanings of Wittgenstein’s 
writings are in harmony with their stylistic form, his concept of ‘showing’ further 
illustrating this idea.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Beckett, language, meaning, absurd, art.
Wittgenstein had said that ‘Philosophy ought really to be written only as a 
form of poetry’ (Wittgenstein 1980:24e), potentially showing that art can 
communicate effectively what commonly used philosophical language can 
only touch upon. It can be argued that the form of Wittgenstein’s writings 
is firmly connected with the message he is trying to convey despite its not 
being poetry. In this essay, I will explore the possibility of looking at Witt-
genstein’s two main works, the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and the Philo-
sophical Investigations, in parallel with two of Beckett’s plays: Not I and Wait-
ing for Godot, all in reference to Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘showing’. At the same 
time, I will argue for the intrinsic connection between form and content in 
philosophical writing which derives from the conclusions drawn in reading 
Wittgenstein and perceiving philosophical concepts.
In his early philosophy, Wittgenstein discusses the problems arising from the 
inefficiency of language in effective or meaningful communication, while 
he later moves on to discuss language as a form of life. These concerns have 
been illustrated in literature, especially in the surreal or absurd movement. 
Samuel Beckett’s writings can be read as ‘the most Wittgensteinian of para-
bles’ (Perloff 1996: 21) insofar as they treat language in a similar way: look-
ing for its potentialities, boundaries, or the interesting and important yet 
neglected implications of trivial, ordinary words. Beckett is an example of a 
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language-conscious writer, creating language-games that reveal language’s 
inadequacy to convey meaning, possibly in a Tractarian way. In other words 
Beckett recognizes ‘the inherent inability of words to correspond to anything 
other than themselves together with the potentiality of expressing this very 
inability to express’ (Velissariou 1982). Both Wittgenstein and Beckett wrote 
on language, and recognised the paradox of doing so since they expressed the 
contradictions, misunderstandings or meaninglessness of words. Yet, nei-
ther could escape the necessity of language, Beckett responding to this by 
saying that ‘words are all we have’(Cavell 1976: 161). Furthermore, Beckett 
employed language as a form of art, which can be read in line with Wittgen-
stein’s distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’; in reference to Waiting for 
Godot, Beckett said that all he knew he showed (Cohn 2006: 122).
Wittgenstein’s use of language makes us conscious of writing style as reflect-
ing the message. This could be true both for his early and later philosophy, 
as exemplified in the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgen-
stein’s very language on language indicates that philosophy and literary style 
are not separate, as the form mirrors the context and content. The Tractatus, 
arguing for the impossibility of articulating anything meaningfully except 
for propositions on the natural sciences, is itself written in the most lacon-
ic, scientific way possible. The author is conscious of the paradox that he 
cannot escape using metaphors, speaking in abstract terms and creating im-
agery, to argue for the opposite use of language and that is why he sees this 
project as a ladder to be kicked away. In embracing the impossibility of that 
impossibility, the language of the Investigations is inclusive, playful, and di-
verse. Here, language is seen as an expression of forms of life, involving dif-
ferent language-games. However, both works accept language as an intrinsic 
part of human life, and make reference to the problems arriving from our 
misconceptions of it. They reflect the author’s desire for clarity, precision, 
and logic -even when the latter is found to be inadequate in his philosophi-
cal enquiry. This is evident in their form: they are both written as enumer-
ated lines of thoughts, rather than conventional philosophical essays. The 
works could not have been written in a different way, ‘because otherwise the 
thoughts [they] present would have been crippled’ (Binkley 1973: 8). This is 
not to say that Wittgenstein’s prose cannot be paraphrased, but that the way 
he writes is an essential part of the thinking process behind the written result.
I. The Language of the Tractatus and the limits of language
The language of the Tractatus is as close to its meaning as possible -concise, 
scientific and seemingly propositional. Wittgenstein attempted to create a 
text composed of seven dense statements, each expanded into some further 
comments. The message of the Tracatus appears to be that language cannot 
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be used to meaningfully describe ethical concerns, since logic and deter-
minacy of sense are its essential grammatical rules. By logically analysing 
language we find its limits, and then we come to see the limits of sensical 
thought (Wittgenstein 2007: 27). The preface, written in familiar prose in-
stead of numerated thoughts, gives a more conventional understanding of 
what will follow. Wittgenstein did not provide extensive arguments devel-
oping his ideas, but rather gave extremely scrutinised assertive statements 
to demonstrate them. This is further illustrated by his comparing the Trac-
tatus with a ladder leading to the conclusion, which has to be kicked away 
once it has been climbed (6.54) (Wittgenstein 2007: 108).
Wittgenstein’s ideas have been described as challenging, and the language he 
uses to show them has been seen as problematic in accessing them (Pitcher 
1964:17). To a certain extent, this is true. Further explanation is often con-
structive and necessary for his philosophy to be understood, while para-
phrasing helps in comprehending his ideas; thus, the value of the relevant 
bibliography in this essay, or a university-level course. After all, ‘the results 
of a great deal of profound thinking are presented rather than the actual pro-
cess of the thinking itself’ (Pitcher 1964:17) However, it can also be argued 
that his language is not some kind of enigma, but rather the reflection of 
the very thoughts expressed. Therefore, his choice of words cannot be sub-
stituted by mere explanation in more familiar, extensive terms, without the 
awareness of them being a replacement, with all the inadequacies or prob-
lems this may have. There is thus the possibility of looking at this project as 
‘performance’ philosophy.
According to Fogelin, what Wittgenstein has achieved is the ‘embodying’ of 
the language he speaks of, in the language he uses (Fogelin 1987:102). What 
is being said is essentially connected, or in ‘harmony’(Gibson 2004) with how 
it is being said. To bring this into a wider context, even though this is most 
often the case for the arts and the very forms of artistic expression, philos-
ophy too cannot escape the medium through which it is expressed (Binkley 
1973: 6). In contrast to presupposing an internal idea of the thought as an 
independent entity in the mind, which then finds a medium for expression 
-in this case, writing- we could argue that the idea manifests itself simulta-
neously as the process of writing it takes place. In a further development of 
this point, Wittgenstein argues in the Investigations that ‘language itself is the 
vehicle of thought’ (PI 329) (Wittgenstein 2009: 113e), yet the message of the 
Tractatus is that these very thoughts are nonsensical if they are not logical.
From the point of view of the Investigations, the Tractatus consists of one lan-
guage-game, with very specific rules. Wittgenstein cannot escape using meta-
phors and abstractions such as ‘ought’ and ‘must’ that appeal to value instead of 
logic in the Tractatus, and so ends up using non-sensical or metaphysical terms 
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to describe the ‘sensical’. The limits of language are thus portrayed in the very 
inability of the author to put forward his idea of not using language through 
a different mean other than ordinary language. Fogelin specifically describes 
this division as ‘object language’ and ‘metalanguage’ (Fogelin 1987: 102). The 
interesting metaphor found in the Lecture on Ethics makes a parallel of lan-
guage to the walls of a cage (Wittgenstein, internet). Similarly, in the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein creates the analogy of language as clothing, covering thoughts:
4.002 Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of 
clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the 
external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than 
to let the form of the body be recognized. (Wittgenstein 2007: 45)
Wittgenstein was cautious and aware of the use metaphors as they could be 
misleading, or taken too far. For example, the walls of the cage can point to 
the fact that a cage has bars, and thus we could see outside of it, while being 
unable to actually reach what is there. The idea that we can see but cannot 
touch the ineffable is pertinent to the notion of showing, which as afore-
mentioned makes sense in the world of art. But comparing language to the 
limits of a cage or to the deceiving properties of clothing, seem to be exam-
ples that portray his ideas effectively. Specifically in the latter case, language 
is described not only as a limiting form of expression, but a misleading one. 
It both hides and deforms the thought it encloses.
4.121 That which mirrors itself in language, we cannot express by language. 
The propositions show the logical form of reality. They exhibit it.
4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said. (Wittgenstein 2007: 53)
In reference to the notions of saying and showing, Wittgenstein asserted that 
what is not factual is ineffable, but it can be shown or shows itself. Since art is 
part of the aesthetical, non-scientific world, what can be expressed through 
art is in effect done so through showing. Despite the fact that what is shown 
might be non-sensical from a strictly positivist perspective, it has the poten-
tial to portray that very notion of the impossibility of expression. The ambi-
guity of the notion of showing has been widely debated. If we loosely speak 
of showing in terms of the arts and not only as a passive process, Beckett’s 
absurd theatre demonstrates the limits of language exceptionally. His plays 
have been interpreted in many different ways, but most interpretations have 
found the author cold. In attempting to read Beckett’s work with reference 
to Wittgensteinian perspectives on language, there is the possibility of at-
tributing the wrong meanings. Nonetheless, it is most definitely the case 
that his plays are highly conscious of linguistic absurdity and the difficulty 
of expression. The limits of language described in the Tractatus are part of 
the universe brought on stage by Beckett.
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II. Beckett - the Absurd
Not I
A scene from Billie Whitelaw’s performance, london, 1973
The play in one act Not I is a monologue, essentially about the self as the ob-
ject: the subject can only refer to itself in the third person. The stage direc-
tions require only the mouth of the actor to be visible. The mouth is articu-
lating apparently nonsensical sentences in an attempt to describe thoughts 
on the subject’s life. The effect of these stage directions generates a discom-
forting, nauseating feeling to the audience, perhaps much like the very feel-
ing of the inability of expression. What is important cannot be said, and so 
what is said are only fragments of thoughts that if put together can create 
what resembles a story. To illustrate this point, Beckett chooses to write a 
play and not a novel, therefore literally showing by a sense-provoking medi-
um the ideas he wants to lay forward. The method of not having the words 
placed together in a conventional way brings the focus not on the story of 
the Mouth, which is seemingly unimportant as it is hardly comprehensible, 
but on the very language employed. The lack of coherent language shows 
exactly its inadequacy to convey a set meaning. It could be argued that the 
play is about meaninglessness, only insofar as Wittgenstein is. The play does 
not necessarily imply the lack of meaning, but the inability to express things 
meaningfully.
‘. . . when suddenly she realized . . . words were- . . . what? . . . who? . . . no! . 
. . she! (pause and movement 2) . . . realized . . . words were coming . . . imag-
ine! . . . words were coming . . . ’
‘. . . and yet in the ordinary way . . . not felt at all. . . so intent one is . . . on 
what one is saying . . . the whole being . . . hanging on its words. . . so that 
not only she had . . . had she
. . . not only had she . . . to give up. . . ’ (Beckett 1976: 597)
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In performance, it might appear that the mouth is rambling, yet there is also 
an awareness of a coherent structure of the text. The flow of words, whether 
connected or seemingly irrelevant to one another can be seen as a demon-
stration of the flow of thoughts. Not I can be read as a manic inner mono-
logue, sometimes resembling a dialogue of which we only see and hear one 
subject. Repetition is key, and what is often repeated is the inability of Mouth 
to express herself with words. Arguably, ‘it is a text which eludes meaning 
by permanently pointing to its lack’ (Velissariou 1993), through the incoher-
ent language employed, and the refusal of Mouth to refer to herself as the 
subject ‘I’. The absurdity of the play is found both in the language used and 
the choice of staging, possibly being a response to the absurdity of humans’ 
overall search for meaning, especially through language. The limits of lan-
guage identified by Wittgenstein are therefore realised through a parallel 
perspective in absurdist theatre.
The equivalent of the term ‘absurd’ in Greek is paralogo (παράλογο), literally 
meaning what is next to thought, logic or linguistic expression. In this re-
spect, the absurd, or in Wittgenstein’s terms the nonsensical, is not entire-
ly outside of logic or sense, but in close proximity to it. The word paralogo 
makes sense only insofar as logos does. The Tractarian ineffability may be 
coinciding with this notion of absurdity shown in Beckett’s theatre. Log-
ic, structure and thought do exist, but there is an alternative sphere of ab-
surdity, which addresses the nonsensical parts of thinking or existing. To a 
certain extent, this is in line with the absurdist philosophy of Camus, and 
the Sisyphean never-ending struggle up the hill. Such readings of Beckett’s 
plays, focusing on an absurdist response to the absurdity of human life, by 
using nonsensical language, have been both accepted and criticised. Writ-
ing in the late 1960’s, Cavell stated that they are nothing ‘more than impo-
sitions from an impression of fashionable philosophy’ (Cavell 1976: 115). 
Yet, in being conscious of that, Cavell also accepted parallels between Witt-
genstein’s views on language and Beckett’s world. More closely related to 
the Investigations, Cavell noted that despite the difficult of expression, we 
are compelled to speak ‘whether we have something to say or not’. Whether 
what we can say is meaningful or not is not relevant. Our desire to do so is 
more accepted in Wittgenstein’s later work. Wittgenstein embraced the no-
tion of different forms of life and their linguistic expressions, which solve 
some of the main problems raised in the Tractatus. That is, language was no 
longer seen as capable only of describing the natural sciences, and so the 
problem of ineffability became almost a non-problem. Yet Wittgenstein still 
did not talk about values and ethics specifically. In quoting Pascal, Cavell 
agrees that ‘all the evil in the world comes from our inability to sit quietly 
in a room.’ (Cavell 1976: 161). Once more, Wittgenstein’s final proposition 
of the Tractatus is relevant.
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Beckett’s response to these concerns manifest themselves in a variety of 
forms, Not I presumably illustrating the problem of meaningful expression 
by pointing directly towards the problems of language, as well as notions of 
solipsism and verbal self-constraint. In other words, ‘by making language 
not only the means, but the very object of his writing, [Beckett] focuses on 
the crisis of the subject’s relation to language.’ (Velissariou 1993). The so-
lipsistic message of the Tractatus (5.6) cannot be expressed in propositional 
terms, but Wittgenstein asserts that ‘what solipsism means (…) shows itself.’ 
(5.62). That is, it is somehow understood, or makes itself manifest in the 
world. The mysticism of these types of concepts in the Tractatus, especial-
ly when Wittgenstein mentions meaning, are to a great extent ambiguous. 
Beckett’s response to such notions of solipsism are reflected in Not I, where 
the ‘I’ problematically becomes the object. Throughout the play, the prob-
lem is the difficulty and absolute denial of Mouth to identify herself as the 
subject: essentially, the ‘I’ cannot be the object, despite any efforts to make 
it the observable. (Pitcher 1964: 146).
III. Language-games
Waiting for Godot
A scene from the first production of en Attendant godot, Paris, 1953
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian perception of language as efficient only for the nat-
ural sciences is found in interpretations of Beckett’s plays. With reference 
to language’s problem of meaningful communication or expression in Wait-
ing for Godot, it has been argued that ‘only a Naturalistic view of language 
as having a direct and unambiguous relation to the world can allow for an 
unproblematic organization of meaning.’ (Velissariou 1982). Beckett uses 
various ‘language-games’ to express this problem, and breaks the boundar-
ies of the form he uses. In this play, the two main characters are waiting for 
someone who will never appear. The time, space as well as any context is 
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unidentified. Essentially, nothing happens: their dialogue does not bring any 
conclusions, and their encounter with a man and his slave brings no further 
light to any logical sense of their waiting. The dialogues taking place include 
continuous repetition, and the meaning seems often to be meaninglessness, 
or the struggle for (its) expression.
Furthermore, it is evident that the problem recognized by Beckett does not 
seem to be only a linguistic, but a metaphysical one. Meaning itself is put into 
question in his plays. Yet, the very fact that there is a wide variety of contrast-
ing interpretations of Beckett’s plays signifies the ambiguity of language, and 
this is argued to be intentional: ‘Beckett does not want what is communicated 
easily to be what he communicates – it is not what he means.’ (Cavell 1976: 
210) The key word here is easily. Language can easily illustrate factual, fal-
sifiable things, but not essential, metaphysical concepts. This is only loosely 
relatable to the early-Wittgensteinian approach, since he did not only con-
sider language to be incapable of expressing non-factual things, but that it 
ought not to. The question of meaning is one that Wittgenstein wanted to 
avoid, specifically the attempts of expressing it through language. However, 
this dogmatic attitude to what language ought to be used for is only part of 
his early philosophy. The Investigations move on to discuss language as a fun-
damentally externalized, social phenomenon, even an art (or art as a techné).
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein wants to investigate the 
trained ways of perceiving, under which we fail to recognize the obvious, 
which philosophy tends to abstract from (PI 131) (Wittgenstein 2009: 56e). 
In this line of thought, Waiting for Godot obstinately focuses on the trivial, 
obvious and common communication, to point specifically at its signifi-
cance. By knowing the rules of the game (dramatic language), Beckett can 
break it -and by making the ordinary extraordinary, create a joke. Moreover, 
by drawing attention to trivial conversations, combined with brief word ex-
changes on happiness, truth and God, Beckett shows that we use the same 
tool to explain things that are seemingly antithetical. How can we talk about 
carrots and shoes, using the same mean as we use for describing emotions 
or the divine? His characters seem unaware of the fact that they are essen-
tially playing games with language, focusing more on how the words sound, 
rather than what they mean.
If Not I was to an extent a Tractarian play, Waiting for Godot can be read more 
closely with the Investigations, and not impossibly as an extensive expression 
of remark 129 of PI: ‘The aspects of things that are most important for us 
are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity’. (Wittgenstein 2009: 
56e). Language is as important and complex, as it is familiar and apparently 
simple, and Beckett points directly to the form of language, the sound rath-
er than the meaning of words, to emphasize their ways of use. Noticing that 
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Beckett expresses the notion that ‘out of its failure to express, language may 
be re-created,’ (Velissariou 1982) he reflects the point made by Wittgenstein 
in arguing for the fluidity of language. (PI 23) (Wittgenstein 2009: 15). The 
view that meaning cannot be found through language is still pertinent, but 
in Waiting for Godot language-games take up the role of nonsensical discon-
nected words. Moreover, moving from the ‘I’ and language as the limit of 
‘my’ world (Wittgenstein 2007: 88), the Philosophical Investigations are about 
the ‘we’, similarly as Waiting for Godot is inclusive of more than one voice. 
Reading the play as an expression of the message of the Investigations can be 
interesting. The two characters’ interaction constitute very different forms 
of dialogue around completely unconnected topics, and this might be ex-
pressing their form of life, or different games within the game of waiting 
(Nealon 1988: 521). Again, this reading cannot avoid ascribing a specific in-
tention behind Beckett’s writing, namely creating a metaphor for existence as 
a pointless ‘waiting’ for something that will never occur, while momentarily 
forgetting their (and our own) inability to stop waiting, and act.
ESTRAGON: Let’s go.
VLADIMIR: We can’t.
ESTRAGON: Why not?
VLADIMIR: We’re waiting for Godot.
ESTRAGON: (despairingly). Ah! (Pause.) (Beckett 1976: 376) (…)
VLADIMIR: Well? Shall we go?
ESTRAGON: Yes, let’s go.
They do not move
Curtain (Beckett 1976: 476)
Furthermore, by deforming what we are used to recognizing as import-
ant and meaningful, making it irrational or pointless, Beckett creates a joke 
through the slave’s speech:
LUCKY: Given the existence as uttered forth in the public works of 
Puncher and Wattman of a personal God quaquaquaqua with white beard 
quaquaquaqua outside time without extension who from the heights di-
vine apathia divine athabia divine aphasia loves us dearly with some ex-
ceptions for reasons unknown but time will tell (…) (Beckett 1976: 413)
The speech continues for three pages, and is arguably a reference to pomp-
ous language of philosophers, theologians or scientists. Beckett questions the 
very validity of using language to express truisms by making a parody of it. 
Would it be taking it too far to assume that Wittgenstein would have laughed 
in acknowledging this? Beckett had claimed never to have read Wittgenstein, 
but reading the former’s work while looking through the latter’s lens can 
bring an interesting new perspective on philosophical activity.
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As Not I was written in such a way to convey an asphyxiating sensation, and 
Waiting for Godot included language-games demonstrating a peculiar but per-
haps recognizable form of life, the succinct Tractarian language is replaced 
in the Investigations by extensive remarks that employ various methods for 
expression, an interlocutor often giving the sense of a dialogue. Once more, 
the message conveyed is relatable to the form. Wittgenstein no longer pos-
es an austere requisite on anguage’s role, but accepts it as an ever-changing 
activity. Language has a dominant role in the ‘sketches’ of thoughts Witt-
genstein presents (Wittgenstein 2009: 3), while he also moves on to discuss 
various different topics and themes relating to cognition, psychology and 
the method of philosophical enquiry. As an attempt to investigate rather 
than inscribe, the language of his later work employs different forms, and 
shows that the author is attempting to express a variety of ideas, being aware 
in his use of language of the problems arising from the theoretical attitude 
that Beckett ridiculed. Remark #297 goes as far as to pose the question of 
whether something is boiling in the picture of a boiling pot. Instances like 
these are found throughout the Investigations, pointing to an almost absurd 
or mad logic. Beckett’s characters are essentially caught in a world where 
these questions constitute many parts of their discourse, which are howev-
er left unanswered, or give the impression of an infinite loop in reasoning.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the fact that Wittgenstein’s radical ideas on 
language and philosophy were put forward in an innovative way. Being con-
scious of stylistic importance, he made reference of this in the preface of both 
the Tractatus and the Investigations. ‘Language-games’ is a term seen as ‘un-
definable’ (Perloff 1996: 20), and the range of explanations and perceptions 
of it makes it more pertinent to Beckett’s plays. This is in line with Wittgen-
stein’s family resemblance theory of universals proposed in the Investiga-
tions, the idea that there are layers of connections between things even when 
apparently there are no common features. An interdisciplinary perspective 
between philosophical writing and literary expression can thus be looked at 
more closely and attentively. The two writers used different language-games 
to respectively express problems of meaning in the world, the problems of 
language as a tool, and problems or potentialities of expression through an 
ever-changing means. Both Wittgenstein and Beckett pushed language it to 
its very limits, precisely by trying to find the margins, and both recognized 
the difficulties arising from attributing the wrong assumptions to linguistic 
expression. As Perloff states, ‘Wittgenstein’s way of attacking philosophical 
problems is best called “aesthetic”’, and this is done in ways that among others 
include ‘sudden leaps of faith.’ (Perloff 1996: 15). This aesthetical approach 
to Wittgenstein’s writing is therefore seen if we closely look at the methods 
and literary devices he uses in both his early and late philosophy. The ideas 
underpinned in Wittgenstein’s two main works are mirrored in these very 
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methods. In turn, Beckett shows through unique dramatic forms similar no-
tions of the limits of language, and encourages the audience to constantly 
be ‘suspicious’ of words.
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Marialena Avgerinu
Vitgenštajnov jezik i Beket: granice jezika i apsurd
Apstrakt
Ovaj članak daje uporedno lingvističko i pojmovno čitanje Vitgenštajnovih i Be-
ketovih dela. Preciznije, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus i Filozofska istraživanja su 
redom posmatrani u odnosu na komade pozorišta apsurda Ne ja i Čekajući Godoa. 
granice jezika, kako su opisane u Tractatus-u, deo su verbalno i konceptualno 
asfiktičkog sveta donetog na scenu od strane Beketa u monologu Ja ne, dok pre-
laz ka ‘jezičkim igrama’ u Filozofskim istraživanjima može da bude identifikovan u 
delovima Čekajući Godoa. Predloženi zaključak jeste da Vitgenštajnov izraz 
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neizrecivog, problematična upotreba jezika i (njegovog) smisla, može da bude i 
jeste izražen u formi umetnosti, dok značenja Vitgenštajnovih spisa jesu u har-
moniji sa njihovom stilskom formom, dok njegov pojam ‘pokazivanja’ dalje ilustru-
je tu ideju.
Ključne reči: Vitgenštajn, Beket, jezik, smisao, apsurd, umetnost. 
